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Abstract. This article compares the work of Jakob von Uexküll and Charles S. Peirce 
to elucidate two contrasting yet connected images of ecosemiotics. The intent is not 
simply to oppose their work, but to explore a tension which has implications for the 
ethical dimension of this emerging discipline. Uexküll’s functional cycle is associated 
with the image of a circle, which, while emphasizing the integration of organism and 
environment, is shown to invoke solipsism, and an overly deterministic depiction 
of ecological relations. Peirce’s drawing of a labyrinth is taken to represent a maze, 
which, while exemplifying the evolutionary play of ecosystems, may entail a level of 
unpredictability that is catastrophically chaotic. The root of these diverging depictions 
is identified with the role of subjectivity in engendering semiotic relations in the work 
of both Uexküll and Peirce. Where the more regressive aspects of Uexküll’s theoretical 
biology are mitigated by a teleological interpretation of life’s underlying causality, 
orientating agency within Peirce’s work depends upon attention to the idea of the self 
in his philosophy of signs. In conclusion, Eduardo Kohn’s conception of an ‘ecology of 
selves’ is cited, and the status of the organism as a living symbol of its environment is 
reaffirmed.
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If a primal scene were to be identified representing the conception of biosemiotics 
then Charles S. Peirce and Jakob von Uexküll may well be identified as the leading 
participants. Both Don Favareau (2006) and Jesper Hoffmeyer (2009: 355–357) 
align these two as major pioneers in the field. Peirce’s contribution rests on his 
development of a philosophical system of semiotics which presented the evolution 
of organizational relations via a triadic logic – a system capable of encompassing 
both natural and conventional signs without presupposing their inexorable divi-
sion. Uexküll is credited for his programme of scientific research developing 
from the assertion that, from a biological point of view, every living organism 
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must be understood in conjunction with an umwelt – an interactive version of its 
environment precipitated by the creature’s physiological means of accessing its 
surroundings. Where Peirce provided a depiction of the formal means by which not 
just humans, but all living organisms could be conceived as staking their existence on 
the efficacy of sign-relations, Uexküll provided a strong sense of the content of this 
realization, demonstrating that the behaviour of all kinds of forms of life depended 
upon the capacity to render external and internal events significant. 
Conjoining these theories lays the foundation for biosemiotics by fusing sign 
science with life science, marrying Peirce’s sense of the generative potential of 
different kinds of signs, to Uexküll’s insight into the diversity and specificity of 
each living organism’s standpoint on a world. Like all the best primal scenes, this 
intellectual tryst embodies a kind of fantasy: in their own lifetimes neither the 
philosopher nor the biologist professed any knowledge of one another’s work, let 
alone met in person. Presiding over this imaginary union we might also single out 
Thomas Sebeok, given his own writings went so far in bringing the ideas of Uexküll 
and Peirce together. In this article I will once again juxtapose the ideas of Peirce and 
Uexküll, this time in the name of ecosemiotics. Yet, rather than aiming to seamlessly 
integrate their thought, my intention is to tease out a particular tension concerning 
the relationship between organisms and their environments as articulated by 
signs. To facilitate this comparison, I will refer to two images or figures of thought, 
examples of which are to be found in the work of Uexküll and Peirce respectively: 
(1) From Uexküll’s Theoretical Biology (1926): a diagram representing a key 
concept within the development of his work: the Funktionskreis, or functional cycle, 
a loop of stimulus and response he proposed governed the basic behaviour of every 
sentient living organism (Fig. 1). 
     
Figure 1. Funktionskreis or functional cycle (Rüting 2004, translated terms by Urmas Sutrop).
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(2) From the Harvard Archive of Peirce’s graphics and letters: an intricate line 
drawing made up of a network of intersecting passages, which appears to represent a 
maze or labyrinth (Fig. 2).
Figure 2. Peirce’s labyrinth (Charles Sanders Peirce papers, MS Am 1537, Houghton Library, 
Harvard University, undated)1.
1 Accessed 18 January 2016 <http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL.Hough:5110311>.
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It is not true to say that these two images may stand sufficiently for the theoretical 
biology of Uexküll on the one hand, and the semiotics of Peirce on the other, as if 
each synechdocally exemplified the overall character of a system. Taken in isolation, 
neither image can be deemed wholly representative of the totality of its originator’s 
work; rather, it is the exceptional character of each which deserves consideration. 
While the circle, in the form of the functional cycle, is certainly central to 
Uexküll’s account of the behaviour of individual living organisms, reduced to a 
material mechanism the sequence of cause and effect it delineates does not express 
the qualitative and teleological aspects of this structure, nor the more complex web 
of relations which exists between organisms of different species. What does make the 
circle stand out, however, is its general applicability as a figure encompassing both 
the ancient ideal of organic nature as a stable, harmonious system, and a relatively 
modern conception of natural processes as machine-like, autonomous, deterministic, 
and effectively inexorable.2 
For Peirce, conversely, a more essentially representative model of his philosophy 
than the maze is to be found in the basic tripartite structure of the sign itself, and it is 
on this foundational element that the synthesis of Peircean semiotics with Uexküll’s 
biology is based. Yet, the maze or labyrinth does convey something of a predicament 
that becomes discernible at the fringes of Peirce’s philosophy: the inexhaustible 
capacity of relations between signs to generate new meanings, and the decisive role 
of spontaneity and chance in engendering these relations, introduces the possibility 
of a chaotic and even catastrophic unpredictability. It is in this capacity that the 
image of a maze evokes a comparable situation of uncertainty confronting attempts 
to respond to environmental problems at both a global and a local level. Ecological 
systems, in this schema, are not fixed in predetermined channels, whether virtuous 
or vicious, rather deviation becomes the rule as both natural and artificial processes 
continuously restructure the context of their emergence. Gregory Bateson aptly 
summed up the epistemological danger inherent in the assumption that this complex 
system may be conveniently segregated, and thereby mastered, when he wrote:
There is an ecology of bad ideas, just as there is an ecology of weeds, and it is 
characteristic of the system that basic error propagates itself. It branches out 
like a rotted parasite through the tissues of life, and everything gets into a rather 
peculiar mess. (Bateson 2000: 492)
2 Th e opposition between an organic and a mechanical conception of nature has frequently 
been identifi ed as a key theme within the history of the natural sciences. For example, Carolyn 
Merchant provides an account of both of these points of view in her book Th e Death of Nature: 
Women, Ecology and the Scientifi c Revolution (1990).
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In outlining the difference between alternate visions of ecology my intention is not to 
drive a wedge between Peirce and Uexküll, obstructing the unification of their ideas 
within biosemiotics, nor to authenticate one at the expense of the other. In important 
respects, the images of the circle and the maze are mutually reflected within the work 
of both Uexküll and Peirce, and therefore best understood in tandem. Yet, they also 
indicate some of the contrary aspects of that newfound ecological consciousness, 
which today is tasked with apprehending the precarious place of the human within 
a potentially inhospitable global environment. In each case, it is not simply the 
insertion of an independent subject into the background of an environment which 
attracts attention; it is the contribution of a subject to the apprehension of this setting, 
and the reciprocal provision of a world to support the emergence of this subject, 
which brings the ethical dimension of ecosemiotics into focus. 
Ecosemiotics and environmental crisis
As yet another addition to the lineage of biosemiotics, ecosemiotics has applied 
principles inherited from Uexküll and Peirce to conceptualize the collective inter-
actions of organisms together with and within a shared environment mediated by 
signs relations. Much like ecology more generally, the field of study determined 
by ecosemiotics is not entirely settled. Papers published by Winfried Nöth (1998) 
and Kalevi Kull (1998) served to encourage interest in ecosemiotics, but early on a 
distinction was made between biological and cultural ecosemiotics (Kull, Nöth 2001). 
Whereas the former concerns the significance sustained by organisms of different 
species in the relationships they form together with an environment, the latter 
focuses specifically upon human relationships to the natural environment in terms 
of their semiotic basis. While this distinction may seem akin to familiar disciplinary 
conventions, for instance separating out human and natural geography, it is more 
nuanced in an important respect. Because ecosemiotics surveys not just the statistical 
flows of matter and energy that compose an ecosystem, but those contextualized 
patterns of semiosis that orientate and redirect the distribution of these flows, the 
tendency to subtract oneself from the picture that has traditionally characterized the 
modern scientific method is shown, from the outset, to be substantially incomplete. 
Perceptual observations are not necessarily neutral, but may, for better or worse, have 
drastic repercussions for the system in which they take place.
Timo Maran and Kalevi Kull (2014) have provided a list of eight key principles 
deemed central to ecosemiotics, intended to integrate different aspects of the field 
within a coherent framework. Of particular relevance here is the assertion that 
cultural phenomena represent both a part and a meta-level of the ecosemiotic network 
connecting sign relations with other ecological factors (Maran, Kull 2014: 45). The 
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semiotic processes that compose cultures are entangled within the ecosystems of 
which they form a part, yet at the same time cultural practices may aspire to model the 
significance of the ecosystem as a whole. From the vantage of ecosemiotics, the beliefs, 
customs, habits and practices which make up culture contribute to an environment 
which must incorporate its own limits in order to map and model the domain within 
which it is nested. The paradoxes apparently inherent in these statements have marked 
consequences for attempts to definitively isolate culture and nature from each other, 
both from a theoretical and a practical perspective. 
With respect to its reconfiguration of natural and cultural categories, ecosemiotics 
can be connected with a number of other philosophical and theoretical interventions 
that have problematized the idea of nature in different ways. Several examples might 
be cited here; however, I will not dwell on the particular theoretical controversies 
distinguishing attempts to rethink the relations between nature, culture, and society.3 
More poignant is an acknowledgement of those escalating practical problems 
stemming from the unanticipated consequences of human use of the environment. 
Overpopulation, rapid and excessive consumption of resources, pollution, species 
extinction, habitat destruction, and the prospect of catastrophic climate change  – 
all these problems suggest that society is not just afflicted by the destruction of its 
environment. In its current form, society is culpable for the perpetuation of this 
destruction. In keeping with the ecological conditions that link such phenomena at 
the root, confronting these problems dictates that the natural environment can no 
longer be regarded as the remit of the natural sciences alone, or indeed be conveniently 
separated from other social, economic, and cultural issues. Properly understood, 
ecology is far from a nostalgic fantasy for some idyllic unspoilt scene of nature. No 
less than the vicissitudes affecting non-human organisms, ecological considerations 
may concern those injustices inflicted on minorities, the impoverished, and all those 
disenfranchised from the environment upon which their livelihoods depend.4
A key theme for biosemiotics has been the rapprochement of science and the 
humanities. Echoing Raymond Williams’ appeal to overcome the legacy of nature 
3 Bruno Latour’s We Have Never Been Modern (1993) and Timothy Morton’s Ecology with-
out Nature (2007) represent two relatively recent and infl uential examples problematizing 
defi nitions of nature and culture. Yet, an emergent sense of the importance of this problem 
can be traced to an earlier time, through the writings of Marx and Engels, to the beginnings of 
Romanticism.
4 As perpetuated by the obfuscation of the link between natural processes and socio-cultural 
concerns, the degradation of the environment takes the form of what Rob Nixon has analysed 
as a “slow violence”, a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight. It is the attrition of 
this slow violence which, by extending “the temporal distance between short-lived actions 
and long-lived consequences”, has the most devastating eff ects on those made vulnerable by 
poverty and confl ict (Nixon 2011: 41).
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cast as an antithesis to the mind, in her book The Whole Creature Wendy Wheeler 
(2006) has identified biosemiotics with “a long and difficult revolution” in the history 
of ideas. At the contested frontier of this long revolution, liberal individualism 
continues to expose its own inadequacy in the face of a more holistic understanding 
of the constrained complexity that has sustained the evolution of culture. An alliance 
of the life sciences together with semiotics offers another framework for analysing 
those factors that complicate attempts to curb ecological degradation. As such, 
this promise might also benefit from a return to first principles, as in a critical 
reassessment of the distinctively associated images of environmental inhabitation that 
can be derived from the work of Peirce and Uexküll.
A Kantian heritage
As Sebeok observed, Uexküll and Peirce had each thoroughly assimilated the core 
Kantian principle that ““raw experience” is unattainable”. Via biology, Uexküll’s idea 
of the umwelt interjected a constitutive aspect of subjectivity into every attempt to 
apprehend reality. In developing his philosophical logic, Peirce proposed that access 
to ‘objects’ depended on the contribution of ‘representamens’ and ‘interpretants’ in a 
structure preceding and complicating the apparent immediacy of sensation. These 
doctrines demonstrated that “experience, to be apprehended, must first be steeped in, 
strained through, and seasoned by a soup of signs” (Sebeok 1991: 20). Yet, while they 
may have agreed on the need for a distinctive theoretical antidote to naive realism, 
the recipes they concocted were not necessarily wholly complementary. 
Uexküll’s Theoretische Biologie (1973[1928]) was consciously conceived as an 
attempt to apply Kantian reasoning to a neglected frontier in the science of life, the 
domain of those subjective processes, irreducible to physical and chemical laws, 
which he maintained were the key to explaining the sentient activity of living orga-
nisms. As a biologist, Uexküll sought to ground these processes empirically, in both 
the physiological attributes of organisms and the relationships they formed with 
other objects and individuals. The internal regularity which seemed to govern the 
minds of animals could only be understood in terms of their activity, and in this 
respect a Kantian logic based purely on laws derived a priori was inadequate, or at 
least incomplete. All the same, Uexküll stressed the enduring merit of Kant’s work, 
as having clearly laid out those formal principles which composed the organisation 
of minds, and, first and foremost, for demonstrating that: “All reality is subjective 
appearance” (Uexküll 1926: xv). 
Peirce’s philosophy, meanwhile, proceeded from a critical revision of Kant’s cate-
gories, replacing the latter’s twelve concepts of the understanding with a single trinity 
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which Peirce claimed was sufficient to unify experience. While Peirce affirmed the 
formative influence of Kant’s philosophy on his own, and credited Kant’s “Copernican 
step” as having opened up “the passage from the nominalistic to the realistic view of 
reality”, he would go on to include Kant in his charge that “all modern philosophy of 
every sect has been nominalistic” (CP 1.19). In Kant’s case this lingering attachment 
to nominalism was especially evident in the idea of the ‘thing in itself ’ inaccessible 
to experience (CP 5.452), but it might also be connected with the inadequate 
understanding of logic and relationality which Peirce associated with German Idealist 
philosophy more generally.5
Both Peirce and Uexküll would likely attest that the Kantian notion of the reality 
of the object, as the product of mental action, was corroborated, not by idealist 
abstraction, but through scientific or pragmatic experimentation. Where they 
would perhaps part ways is in the identity and privilege they would assign to the 
agent of this experimentation, as, in a more contemporary parlance, an observer of 
observation, able to at once apprehend a world, and conceive of its own paradoxical 
capacity to take up a perspective on the differentiation of that world. Peirce and 
Uexküll would agree that knowledge of our environment is mediated and therefore 
necessarily conditioned, but in a certain respect their sense of the nature and 
origins of the experience of reality nourishing this knowledge was subtly different. 
Where Uexküll sought to explain how particular species of organisms proactively 
construct their reality through sign action, Peirce’s philosophy presents sign action 
itself as a general factor presupposed in an emergent knowledge of reality. From 
a methodological point of view, for Uexküll the natural factor embedded in the 
embodied form of an organism took precedence over signs, whereas for Peirce signs 
themselves had a logical priority over the mind and body of the individual. 
In both the English edition of his Social Systems, and the first chapter of his 
Ecological Communication, Niklas Luhmann remarks that a critical consequence of 
the Kantian semantics of the subject, which rose to prominence at the end of the 
18th century, was the subsequent invention of an opposite relative to the subject: 
namely, the umwelt, or environment, as that which did not merely surround or 
contain the individual, but, through its differentiation, contributed substantially 
to the constitution of the individual’s awareness and survival (Luhmann 1989: 1–7; 
1995: xxxix). In Uexküll’s work the decisive impact of this realization is patent. 
Uexküll went further than those who would define umwelt, environment, and milieu 
principally in physical terms, pre-empting a distinction between environment and 
5 Th e precise relation of Peircean to Kantian philosophy may be disputed, though an affi  nity 
can be established over and above Peirce’s own criticisms of Kant’s work. Gabriele Gava’s book, 
Peirce’s Account of Purposefulness: A Kantian Perspective (2014), provides a thorough validation 
of one important aspect of this affi  nity. 
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world later made by Francisco J. Varela as the source of a “surplus of signification 
which haunts the understanding of the living and of cognition” (Varela 1991: 85–86). 
In Peirce’s writings the connotations of this emerging concept of a constitutive 
relation between the subject and its environment are rather more obscure. Peirce’s 
opposition to psychological accounts of logic meant that he sought to define 
the workings of signs in the most universal terms, rather than on the basis of an 
individual’s perspective on a world. While phenomenology, or what he also called 
phaneroscopy, was an important part of Peirce’s philosophy, it was not so much 
concentrated on the point of view of the individual, as orientated towards those 
qualities, facts, and laws which attained the most elemental generality (CP 1.284). 
In keeping with the tradition begun independently by Franz Brentano and Edmund 
Husserl, Peirce held that the reality of mind must be understood as irreducibly 
intentional, but unlike these better known phenomenologists he did not present this 
stance as an inexplicable presupposition of thought (Hoffmeyer 2012: 103–105). For 
Peirce, the intentionality of mind represented the living sign of a relational semiotics 
that could neither be dismissed as illusory, nor abstracted from the emergent logic 
guiding material processes. 
Uexküll’s circle
For Uexküll, environmental themes were of course paramount: the notion that every 
animal inhabits a specific sort of umwelt situated ecological together with ethological 
questions at the heart of biology. Each umwelt embodied a sphere of experience 
at once opened up and constrained by the blueprint of a species’ physiology. This 
schema established the relationship between organism and environment, as not just 
that of metabolic energy extraction, but as a dynamic generating sense and meaning. 
Just as the umwelt framed the organism, defining the limits of its potential, so, in 
turn, the sensory information it manifested enabled the individual to frame a portion 
of the nature by which it was confronted, carving out a relatively stable niche within 
unpredictable surroundings.
The crux of the bond between an organism and its corresponding umwelt was 
what Uexküll called the functional cycle. This concept developed out of Uexküll’s 
experimental research into muscular regulation. His early reputation as a scientist 
was secured by his discovery that the excitation of nerve cells is directed towards 
outstretched muscle, maintaining what would later become known as reafferent 
control (Rüting 2004: 39–40). This discovery demonstrated that the brain of an 
animal maintained a regulatory causal link with the muscular capacity of its limbs, 
enabling it to receptively adjust its movements in conjunction with changes to the 
objective of its activity. By supplying an example of the decisive role of negative 
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feedback within a biological system, Uexküll’s research in this direction has been 
identified as a notable precursor of cybernetics. Taking the mechanism of negative 
feedback as a paradigm for their investigations, those active at the Macy Conferences 
in the 1940s and 1950s sought to elucidate parallels between technological and 
physiological processes, modelling the interactions between systems, information, 
and environments in a manner that would prove influential for both biosemiotics and 
ecological science. Yet so far as Uexküll himself was concerned, even more profound 
than the quantifiable dimension of this physiological dynamic was the realization 
that it must also be invested in a qualitative cognitive framework.
As Carolo Brentari (2015: 97–98) recounts, the notion of the functional cycle 
represented something of a watershed in Uexküll’s thinking: the replacement of 
a chapter on “The reflex” with that entitled “The functional cycle” in the second 
edition of Uexküll’s Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere attests to the importance of this 
shift. The introduction of this concept enabled Uexküll to integrate a sequence of 
stimulus and response together with the environment in which these interactions 
gained cogency, and to expose the question of the underlying cause of behavioural 
acts, which reflex models of behaviour failed to confront adequately (Brentari 
2015: 98). The functional cycle illustrated the means by which the capabilities of a 
particular organism and the features attracting its attention slotted into one another, 
comprising a systematic whole (Uexküll 1957[1934]: 10). It schematized the process 
whereby the animal was at first able to recognise the implications of a particular 
object or event, and thereafter couple this manifestation with a practical response. 
As Uexküll outlined in a diagram of the functional cycle, each impulse for 
action was arranged in a self-contained feedback loop, dividing the inner world 
of the organism into two halves (Uexküll 1926: 155–156). One half received those 
impres sions derived from external stimuli, establishing a facet of the world as 
sensed, the other converted this information into a practical response, creating a 
world of effective action. The rules that dictated which features were available for 
recognition, together with the functions they triggered, were always specific to a 
particular species, being intransigently determined by the bodily organs this species 
possessed. This meant that the categories and values which human beings took for 
granted when making sense of their surroundings were inappropriate when it came 
to apprehending the umwelt of another species. 
Within multiple iterations of different functional cycles chained together every 
possible aspect of a creature’s experience was encompassed, incorporating every item 
of perception, along with every instance of behaviour. Cycles devoted to the physical 
medium through which movement took place, along with food, shelter, the threat 
of predators, and the attraction of reproductive partners, amounted to some of the 
most important functions eliciting and directing activity (Uexküll 1982[1940]: 33). 
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In effect, each animal was enclosed within a sphere of interlocking circles, a sphere 
commensurable with that occupied by individuals of the same species, but utterly 
inaccessible so far as the immediate experience of other forms of life was concerned. 
As Uexküll (1926: 42) put it, as a summation of its functional cycles the umwelt of 
an organism formed an invisible soap bubble, completely surrounding the creature 
within. Operating as both barrier and filter, the inner membrane of this bubble acted 
as a one-sided screen, behind which the depths of infinity were hidden.
Extending Uexküll’s metaphor, together, the invisible bubbles of a multitude of 
umwelten formed a living foam, a foam remarkable not just for the vitality suspended 
within each of its bubbles, but also for the adhesive pattern that maintained overall 
unity. When it came to explaining the interaction of different species within the 
same habitat, Uexküll tended to employ metaphors associated with music, to evoke 
the overarching plan he believed maintained order within nature (Clements 2011). 
Through the set of rules implemented by each of its functional cycles, every species 
pursued the equivalent of a different melody, with its population representing a 
different set of instruments within an orchestra. By composing the natural factors 
intrinsic to each organism, Nature’s plan worked like a symphony, ensuring that the 
closed autonomous umwelt of a particular form of life was arranged to intersect 
harmoniously with those of other species. In this way predator and prey could 
effectively know, and so pursue or avoid, one another, acting in concert despite 
inhabiting intrinsically incommensurable versions of reality. 
Uexküll’s conception of a natural factor, guiding the activity of organisms, while 
remaining definitively unknowable, inevitably presents problems when met with a 
more contemporary understanding of ecological evolution. What Brentari (2015: 
114) calls Uexküll’s fixism, i.e. the conviction that the behaviour and physiology 
of every animal species was consistently predefined, precluded direct access to the 
environments of other species, even as it conveyed the diversity of their respective 
worlds. Furthermore, the notion of a natural factor innate within the structure of 
every organism makes it difficult to avoid the characterization of evolution as a kind 
of preordained historical narrative, rather than an open-ended, indeterminate, and so 
genuinely creative process. On this basis, Uexküll’s ostensible faith in an overarching 
harmony prevailing in nature can all too readily be criticized as naive, an indulgence 
of that presumption of a self-correcting natural equilibrium, which, more than once, 
has blighted ecological interventions.6 
6 In his Discordant Harmonies (1992), Daniel B. Botkin has provided a brief history of the 
fallacy that natural processes spontaneously attain balance, along with several examples of its 
destructive repercussions. It is worth noting that Botkin’s critique is applied just as vigorously 
to the mechanistic depiction of nature as a vast machine, as it is to the antithetical organicist or 
vitalist standpoint to which Uexküll more readily seems to subscribe.
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What remains highly pertinent within Uexküll’s work is his intense interest in 
the diverse yet singular relations between living systems and their environments, 
relations which he rightly surmised could not be straightforwardly reduced to a 
sequence of causes and effects, without due consideration to the self-referential 
character of observation. Arguably, in so far as our access to a globalized environ-
ment is limited both by the fragmentary condition of scientific knowledge, and the 
socio-economic constraints which curb coordinated action, we remain beholden to 
an impoverished version of those interlocking circles which Uexküll identified with 
the functional cycle. The question is what this image of ecosemiotics represents, 
when stripped of the reassurance that nature preserves an ideal state of order ready 
to be reinstated?
Uexküll recognized that human beings tended to cut loose from the umwelt 
into which they were born, founding a view of the objective world on the basis of 
symbolic abstraction, and thereby building up an image of reality which surpassed 
the immediate experience of their senses (Uexküll 2001[1936]: 109–110). He also 
regarded this idea of objectivity as in the end provisional, being predicated upon 
those basic functional cycles which allowed human individuals to negotiate their 
surroundings. The technologically mediated existence which, already in Uexküll’s 
time, had come to typify modernity, instituted an especially hubristic idea of the 
objective, since it tended to detach and distort the distinct umwelten into which 
individuals were embedded. 
At base humans were strangers to one another, unable to see past the contin-
gencies colouring their view of reality. With this idea in mind, Uexküll (1926: 97) 
compared the human umwelt to a theatre: 
It is most unfortunate that we can never behold the consciousness-stage of 
another living being; nothing would be more instructive than to see the world 
through the schemata of another. But at least let us never forget, as we watch our 
fellow-men going to and fro around us, that they are treading the boards of our 
stage, and we theirs. The stages are never identical; in most cases, indeed, they are 
fundamentally different. And we can never hope to play on the stage of others the 
role that we play on our own. 
Despite the bond organizing their proximity, each umwelt remained inviolable, 
since the individual it contained could only communicate with its peers by proxy, 
i.e. in accordance with those prescribed forms which governed its relations. At its 
most affirmative the image of ecosemiotics that Uexküll grants is that of a resonant 
biological universe, rich in sense and feeling, but in its bleaker aspect this image also 
invokes isolation, as if every individual organism were ultimately confined to its own 
private circular cell. 
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Peirce’s maze 
Compared to Uexküll, the role of the environment within Peirce’s work is much more 
oblique. Peirce did not discuss ecological issues in any detail, and – unlike some of 
those Pragmatic philosophers whom he influenced, notably William James and John 
Dewey – he rarely referred to the environment as a significant concept in its own 
right. Nevertheless, the importance of relationality and context to the analysis of 
semiotic structures helps to justify a reading of Peirce’s work attuned to its ecological 
implications. As Maran has highlighted, there is evidently an intuitive resemblance 
between Peirce’s portrayal of semiosis as a process of dynamic growth and those 
transitional processes which contribute to the natural history of an ecosystem (Maran 
2007: 270). Where natural ecology charts connections between environments and 
organisms via the succession of generations, food chains, and the cycling of chemical 
substances, Peircean semiotics traces the passage of signs linking objects and inter-
pretants, by way of those feelings, habits, and inferences of mind which serve to 
harbour these vectors of reference. 
A key factor justifying an ecologically inclined re-appropriation of Peirce stems 
from the philosopher’s appreciation of the value of evolution in explaining patterns 
of natural development. This appreciation extended not just to Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection, which Peirce greatly admired for emphasizing the role of ‘fortuitous 
variation’, or what he called Tychism, in establishing physical laws. It also stretched 
to the principle of habit-taking, which Peirce associated with Lamarck’s account 
of evolution through the transmission of acquired characteristics (CP 6.299). 
And further, to his own notion of Agapism, a power of sympathy which Peirce 
held impelled the evolutionary development of ideas through mutual attraction 
and collaboration (CP 6.307). Both Tychism and Agapism represented essential 
compliments to the mechanical necessity, or Anancism, which Peirce perceived 
was already unduly pri vileged by many of Darwin’s followers, in their emphasis on 
competitive struggle, fitness, and adaptation as the primary motors of evolutionary 
change. Offering a sentiment that seems to foreshadow something of Uexküll’s 
ecology, Peirce proposed that in nurturing ideas “[t]he movement of love is circular, 
at one and the same impulse projecting creations into independency and drawing 
them into harmony” (CP 6.288). Yet, with respect to the image of the environment 
latent within Peirce’s philosophy, it is his conceptualization of the mind as the vessel 
of evolutionary ideas that proves most revealing, and here his possible differences 
from Uexküll become more pronounced. 
In a critical reconfiguration of what might be deemed our common-sense 
understanding of experience, Peirce did not locate the mind, as a purely spiritual 
point of view, on the one side, and the world, as material nature, on the other. 
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Rather than being something shut up in a skull which was then surrounded on all 
sides by the outer limits of the environment, the mind was itself open, externalized 
in the form of those intelligible patterns which characterized natural development. 
Consciousness and the inward aspect of feeling were not the essential attributes 
of mind; this misunderstanding arose from the fact that biological organisms, 
especially those endowed with a nervous system, tended to exemplify the possession 
of a mind (CP 7.364). Additionally, matter was not wholly indifferent or mindless; 
it was “nothing but mind that had such indurated habits as to cause it to act with 
a peculiarly high degree of mechanical regularity” (CP 6.277). As these premises 
suggest, for Peirce the mind was not absolutely individual. Instead, it articulated the 
lively reality of generality, conveying the logic of relations between individuals, rather 
than being confined to any particular substance or body. 
Peirce’s idea of mind can be affiliated with a number of other inter-related 
concepts within his system. The mind was informed by Thirdness, as the predictive 
mediate relation between Firstness, which stood for the singular quality of a 
possibility, and Secondness, which invoked the particular force of an action (CP 
1.537; CP 5.469). As the recipient of a sign, and the means by which its relation to 
an object was represented, the mind situated the interpretant, thereby producing a 
mental or physical effect, as in a feeling, exertion, or the notion of another sign (CP 
2.493–4). By allocating a triadic structure to signs, Peirce moved beyond a simplistic 
dualism connecting the thing to a corresponding signifier, and avoided polarizing the 
mental aspect of signs and the physical objects to which they referred. His semiotics 
called attention to the diverse means by which information may be transported 
from a particular thing into a new context, emphasizing the pragmatic generation 
of significance that this process of displacement entailed. In effect, as the site of an 
interpretant introducing collateral information in order to determine the identity of 
a sign, a mind or quasi-mind acted as a localized instantiation of the environment.
Although human beings maintained specialized access to signs, this did not mean 
that those minds involved in semiosis were exclusively human. Peirce was frequently 
evasive when it came to discussing this issue of non-human signs. For good reasons, 
partly connected with his interest in formal logic, he tended to concentrate on 
sign usage by or between persons. Nevertheless Peirce provided plenty of hints 
within his writings justifying an account of semiotics substantially opposed to 
anthropocentrism. For Peirce, signs not only passively rendered the world legible on 
behalf of an observer – through the complex patterns informing their growth they 
were actively involved in the generation of a world. As the embodiment of signs 
and a process orientating the development of everything, from bee hives to crystals, 
thought, Peirce argued, was in evidence throughout the purely physical world (CP 
4.511); signs must therefore play an active role in the formation of nature as well 
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as knowledge. A plant which extracted nourishment from sunlight, and the animal 
which set out to eat this plant, even the weather system which added fresh water 
to the mix, insofar as they contributed to intelligible relations, all of these incidents 
already implied the production and interaction of signs. The presence of a bystander 
able to picture and pass on news of these events was not primary; rather, in its own 
right every fact preserved or predicted by way of a sign contributed to a process of 
ecological evolution.
Integral to the growth, which Peirce claimed was a primordial element of 
the universe (CP 6.157), was the fact that the interpretant of a sign could in turn 
become another significant object, with its own potential for engendering semiosic 
relations. Successively, every representation might become the basis of another 
representation in an endless series (CP 1.339). Abstraction, as the process by which 
a thought-sign became the object of another thought-sign (CP 4.549), was not just 
the business of scientific investigation; for Peirce, it also represented the means by 
which reality acquired complexity. Like an organic tissue of interwoven strands, signs 
grew. And, by recursively articulating and deciphering their own significance, signs 
evolved along with the universe itself, introducing new patterns, habits, and laws into 
existence.
As a stylized portrait of that tangled web of signs which was both the nexus of 
every mind and the medium by means of which the universe gained coherence, 
Peirce’s drawing grants us a limited sense of what his image of ecosemiotics might 
amount to. Admittedly, Peirce himself did not specify what this drawing was 
supposed to represent, but Sebeok (2001: 75) for one was unable to resist imagining 
a depiction of the labyrinth of signs in which every interpreter is eternally destined 
to wander. Although this drawing is not itself a formal diagram, Peirce did identify 
his attempts to devise a graphical method for representing logical propositions with 
a childhood predilection for solving mazes. He recalled that his logical bent allowed 
him to take pleasure in the act of tracing paths upon a map of an imaginary labyrinth, 
in the hope of plotting a route to a central compartment, and professed that this was 
yet another way of performing experimentation upon a diagram (CP 4.533).7 
As a frame of nature, the labyrinth implies at least one critical difference from a 
circle or a soap bubble. The labyrinth does not simply border the space it contains 
in the manner of an empty vessel. Like the convoluted folds of a cerebral cortex, 
or like the ventriculated interior membrane of the body, a labyrinth coils its limits 
7 Th e same enthusiasm may have prompted Peirce to entitle his fi nal series of articles in Th e 
Monist “Some amazing mazes”, and to begin with an epigraph quoting Milton: 
Mazes intricate.
Eccentric, interwov’d, yet regular
Th en most, when most irregular they seem. (CP 4.585)
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within itself, filling out the volume which it serves to frame. While a uniform circle 
or sphere defines an interior and an exterior in term of a single distinction, through 
its twists and turns a labyrinth differentiates this difference in a variety of ways. In 
short, a labyrinth may reinvent, rather than circumvent, the extent of a dimension. 
Returning to the idea of interpretants becoming the object of further interpretants, 
what from one point of view represents potentially infinite regression, from another 
becomes a source of generative digression. 
Still, for Peirce, beyond the positive aspect of the maze as an opportunity for 
exploration, there was another side to this theme, which perhaps had as much to 
do with anxiety as it did with curiosity and play. In the synopsis of one of the many 
books which Peirce failed to complete, he wrote portentously: “We find ourselves in 
the vestibule of the labyrinth. Yes, The Labyrinth – in the Vestibule only, but yet in 
that tremendous, only Labyrinth” (CP 2.79). While the implicit danger of Uexküll’s 
vision was that of individual segregation and solipsism, the occupant of Peirce’s 
labyrinth ran the risk of becoming irredeemably lost and confused, abandoned in 
a world endlessly appending new avenues, and therefore always apparently on the 
brink of oblivion. 
In From the Tree to the Labyrinth, Umberto Eco (2014: 51) associates Peirce with 
the problem of engendering too much, rather than too little knowledge, identifying 
the potentially infinite and therefore unstable structure of encyclopaedias with 
Peirce’s principle of unlimited semiosis. The corresponding vertigo of the labyrinth 
is triggered by a paralysing excess of choices, and the failure to forget the significance 
of each (Eco 2014: 76–78). 8 Similarly, Murray G. Murphey (1993: 301) suggests that 
the early development of Peirce’s logic ended up relegating the real to an interminable 
series of cognitions: “[a]s a result, Peirce’s position degenerates into an extreme form 
of subjectivism in which we are lost in a phantasmagoric maze of our own concepts”. 
If with his semiotics Peirce’s ambition was to discover at last a Mathesis Universalis, 
devising a single universal frame for nature, then his system runs the risk of blurring 
the boundaries between individuals and the world to the point of collapse. In this 
case, it is not a lack of understanding or empathy which undermines attempts to 
preserve the natural environment; it is the prospect that every new decision can only 
make matters worse.
8 As another example, Eco cites Jorge Luis Borges’s story “Funes the Memorious”, the story of 
a man whose prodigious memory persists to such an unbearable degree that rational thought is 
made impossible by the recollection of minute particularities and irrelevant details (Eco 2014: 
75). Th is stress on and of the particular can be contrasted with a sense of general forms, which 
depends on a degree of vagueness and redundancy. 
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The vanishing subject
From an ecological standpoint, what Peirce and Uexküll shared was the insight that 
the changing nature of the environment encompassed the distribution of signs as 
well the transference of energy. Just as the work of bodies served to accumulate or 
exhaust supplies of energy, the communication of signs and their emergence within 
the umwelt of an organism involved the encryption or expression of meaning. Vital 
to appreciating both of these two images of ecosemiotic framing is the principle 
that a context does not simply surround the situated individual impassively. In its 
differentiation, context supplies a mind with information, constitutively inscribing a 
site with signs, and investing those signs with the potential for interpretation. For this 
reason, the framing of nature is always double: the apprehension of an environment 
frames the significance of the natural world, yet it is also the pretext of a frame which 
cultivates the capacity for identifying significance in the first place. Where Uexküll 
and Peirce differed is in the role they initially attributed to the inhabitant of a given 
environment or context.
For Uexküll, regulating every functional cycle, and so leading the way at the 
centre of each umwelt, was a subject. It was this subjective aspect of the organism 
that animated an environment, enriching it with meaning, and converting what 
would otherwise remain an undifferentiated surrounding into the lived experience 
of a world. From this subjective side, an umwelt was not unlike Peirce’s labyrinth: 
Uex küll envisaged each subject weaving its relations like the threads of a spider 
web, fabricating a network which served to sustain its existence. By virtue of its 
subjectivity, every animal, from the simplest to the most complex, formed a perfect 
couple together with its umwelt. As a law unto itself, even an individual cell could 
be deemed a subject, since its activity followed a set of prescribed rules which 
Uexküll insisted were irreducible to any mechanical process. What varied was the 
degree of complexity this relationship entailed: the simple animal inhabited a simple 
umwelt; the multiform animal dwelt within an umwelt as richly articulated as its own 
physiology. In either case, it was this subjective core which ensured that the organism 
as a whole acted in accordance with nature’s plan. 
The problem that this conviction seemed to entail was that of ever finding 
empirical evidence of where this spirit of subjectivity might originate. Although 
Uexküll was happy to attest that the subject “lies concealed, eternally beyond the 
reach of know ledge” (1957[1934]: 80), on occasion he seemed unable to resist the 
temptation to provide proof of this inexplicable essence of life. He veered closest 
to vitalism when contrasting the mysterious qualities of protoplasm with the 
functional framework in which this material was contained. As the remarkable 
“living” substance enshrined in every cell and apparently capable of spontaneous 
regeneration, protoplasm seemed to embody a transcendent subjectivity directing 
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life (Uexküll 1926: 114). Through the course of the 19th century many scientists 
had come to see living processes as a consequence of the organizing properties 
of protoplasm, and this trend persisted during the first half of the 20th century. 
Unlike those, such as Thomas Huxley, who had viewed protoplasm as verifying 
the materiality of vital forces, Uexküll pursued the opposite conclusion: the 
morphogenesis of protoplasm represented evidence of “supermechanic properties” 
which resisted empirical analysis (Brentari 2015: 65–70). The “perfect machine” 
embodied by the organism’s physiology was created, ruled, and regulated by the non-
material order inaccessibly embedded in protoplasm (Uexküll 1926: 123). In fact, 
as genetics would eventually establish, neither account of protoplasm was adequate, 
although the flaw in both a materialist and neo-vitalist approach to the question of 
an essence of life runs deeper than a failure to examine the chemical composition of 
cells in enough detail. 
What obscures matters in the analysis of protoplasm, eliding the depth of 
Uexküll’s own insight, is the identification of the subjective aspect of an organism as a 
cause in a sense already unduly diminished by the prejudices of scientific modernity. 
The difficulty was not the postulated existence of a biological factor supplementing 
the sequential execution of a physical cause and material effect, so much as the push 
to establish the cause of that which, apparently by definition, was without a cause. 
Understood in these deterministic terms it was inevitable that Uexküll’s reference 
to an unknowable natural factor must perpetuate a self-defeating pattern of circular 
reasoning, and make it difficult to avoid the conclusion that, much like the Cartesian 
cogito, the presence of an irreducible subject was presumed to be relevant before 
the question of its existence was even asked. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2003: 176) 
memorably remarked, by consolidating a chain of objects within experience without 
itself becoming an object, Uexküll’s notion of the subject acted like “a pure wake [...] 
related to no boat”; it left behind the traces of a disturbance without evincing the 
involvement of anything other than a phantom culprit.
In contrast to Uexküll, a sustained philosophical analysis of the subjective is 
glaringly absent from Peirce’s writings. His scattered references to this topic were 
principally dismissive, as he explained in a letter to Lady Welby:
I do not make any contrast between subject and object, far less talk about 
‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ in any of the varieties of the German sense, which I 
think have led to a lot of bad philosophy, but I use ‘subject’ as the correlative of 
‘predicate’, and speak only of the ‘subjects’ of those signs which have a part which 
separately indicates what the object of the sign is. (Peirce 1953: 24)
This characterization makes the role of the subject for Peirce seem largely contingent, 
the product of an ongoing process of semiosis rather than the proponent. Although 
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required tangentially in so far as the sign of a given object implies a destination, 
it is the contextualized determination of the interpretant, rather than the will or 
conscious reflection of the subject, which endows a sign with meaning. This is not 
to say that subjective dispositions, such as intention for example, were irrelevant. Far 
from it, intention could make the difference between an insignificant accident and 
an event which deserved decoding. What was important here was not the subject’s 
alleged capacity to contrive an occurrence beyond any physical mechanism. What 
mattered was that intention implied a situation sufficiently complex to justify 
continued interpretation. Like any meaningful event, an act of intention involved 
not just cause and effect, but a third factor contextualizing and thereby interpreting 
the connotations of object and sign. In this role a subject supplied no more than the 
blank surface upon which a form or character may be inscribed, a grammatical and 
logical structure associated with the predicate, rather than the metaphysical locus of 
individual agency.
It may seem unsurprising then that Peirce was frequently derisive when it came to 
considering our distinctly human preoccupation with the identity of the subjective self. 
He compared personal existence to an illusion and a practical joke (CP 4.68), declaring 
that the individual person was a mere cell of a social organism, distinguished only by 
faults, limitations, and the aberration of a blind-will (CP 1.467; 1.673). The peculiar 
appearance and apparent alienation of the occupant of Peirce’s maze conceivably 
reflects his antipathy towards this theme. To conclude, simplistically, we might end by 
opposing Uexküll’s romantic conception of the living subject capable of spontaneous 
self-determination, to Peirce’s postmodern conviction that it is in fact the exchange and 
elaboration of signs that shapes the cosmos. On the one hand, the precarious position 
of the ephemeral individual isolated within a beguiling sphere of sensation, on the 
other, the prospect of losing oneself forever within that labyrinthine network of signs in 
which our communal existence is entangled. There is, though, another way of linking 
the differentiation of the environment and the emergence of a self-conscious being.
Teleology and the symbolic differentiation of the self
As Hoffmeyer (2004) argues in his essay on Uexküll’s concept of Planmässigkeit, 
rather than conceiving of nature’s accordance with a plan such that a vital force 
or transcendent spirit must be deemed responsible for directing the activity of 
organisms, it is a revival of Aristotelian teleology which clarifies this conception 
of purposiveness within nature. In place of an efficient cause, as in the immediate 
and physical agent of change upon which positivistic science tends to be fixated, the 
Aristotelian notion of a final cause better describes the potential inscribed within the 
function cycles that make up an umwelt. Final causation does not explain events in 
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terms of a desire or compulsion for particular ends, rather it denotes a more general 
outcome that may be brought about in a variety of ways:
[F]inal causes, as Aristotle conceived them, are types of outcomes. As such they 
are potentialities, whether or not actualized, as for instance an acorn, whose 
‘destination’ it is to grow into an oak, not into a birch or a salamander – but 
which, as is well known, most often doesn’t grow at all. (Hoffmeyer 2004: 76)
The potential for an acorn to become an oak does not just depend on the inner 
capacity of the germinating seed for organized growth, it also pertains to a whole 
host of other factors, and accidents, including the habits of other organisms within 
the same environment. In other words, the final cause of the acorn entails an entire 
ecology of different relations, and is, as Hoffmeyer (2004: 84) puts it, “irreducibly 
bound to the whole biosemiotics setting […] a product of endless diversifications of 
holistic patterns”. 
By associating the sequencing of functional cycles with the metaphor of a melody – 
an organized structure that exceeded the here and now of physics – Uexküll applied 
a version of teleological reasoning to the behaviour of living organisms (Stjernfelt 
2001: 87–88). The teleological circle which connects the first note of a refrain to the 
intonation of the last involves a duration that is at once irreducible and articulate. 
Just as the performance of a melody may always be subject to slight variations, a 
functional cycle was not necessarily wholly opposed to indeterminacy, nor was 
the possibility of acquiring new habits irrevocably ruled out. From a teleological 
point of view the intimate bond between the organism and its environment, which 
seemed to stem from subjectivity, should not be seen as an isolated unit, but rather 
as the product of patterned relations between things. While abstracted from the 
context of their actual interactions, each coupled umwelt and organism would 
appear impervious to its counterparts, but reframed within the semiosphere, as 
the condition of their evolution, a more complete picture of the relationality of 
ecosemiotics becomes apparent.
If teleology begins to lead the way out of a restricted conception of Uexküll’s 
umwelt towards a more open interpretation of his ecology, then re-orientating the 
sense of agency within Peirce’s semiotics must involve a further consideration of the 
subjective self. Despite his persistent disdain for subjectivity, there is evidence that 
Peirce, particularly in his later writings, was concerned to appreciate the importance 
of the idea of the self for his philosophy. Vincent Colapietro (1989) has made a 
particularly strong case for the role of the self in Peirce’s work, arguing that although, 
initially, he saw the self solely as a sign in the process of development, Peirce 
eventually advanced this notion to include a vision of the person as an autonomous 
agent of reason. Peirce’s 1885 revision of his categories, which Murphey claims was 
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necessary to evade the risk of infinite regression, involved a move back towards a 
more Kantian conception of transcendental experience, helping to establish a 
decisive role for subjective selfhood (Murphey 1993: 303). Ivan Mladenov (2006: 107) 
suggests that Peirce’s irritation with any direct discussion of subjectivity stemmed 
from his commitment to a more fluid, dynamic, and itinerant understanding of this 
concept, out of step with prevailing attitudes towards the identity of the human mind. 
Just like the mind to which it served to lend specificity, the Peircean self was 
neither wholly individual, nor defined purely by consciousness. Yet, at the same 
time, the self personified an aspect of felt Firstness which was singularly ineffable, 
and which therefore could not be swallowed up entirely by its social relationships 
(Colapietro 1989: 74). In dialogue with both its own history and the community of 
which it was a member, the Peircean self could not be adequately defined by the self-
interested motives of the ego (Colapietro 1989: 96). Poised in a process of interference 
between ‘I’ and the ‘Other’, the individual and the community, the subject could never 
fully coincide with itself; it depended on ignorance and error in order to distinguish 
its own existence (CP 5.235). Accordingly, to maintain integrity the self must retain 
a level of self-control, very much like the cybernetic guidance system established by 
Uexküll’s functional cycle, consolidating not just a provisional private sphere, but the 
trajectory of a communicative agent (Colapietro 1989: 79). 
In his anthropological study of the relations between the Runa people of Ecuador’s 
Upper Amazon, and the forest in which they dwell, Eduardo Kohn (2013: 78) has 
expanded Peirce’s notion of the self still further:
The semiotic quality of life – the fact that the forms that life takes are the 
product of how living selves represent the world around them – structures the 
tropical ecosystem. Although all life is semiotic, this semiotic quality is amplified 
and made more apparent in the tropical forest, with its unparalleled kind and 
quantities of living selves. [...] 
The worlds that selves represent are not just made up of things. They are also, 
in large part, made up of other semiotic selves. For this reason I have come to 
refer to the web of living thoughts in and around the forests of Ávila as an ecology 
of selves. 
As Kohn recognizes, and the Runa ably demonstrate, together with the community 
that nurtures its representation, the ecology of selves encompasses a myriad of non-
human or more than human beings. This enhanced sense of the self, as a confluence 
of diverse representations, extends to include non-human creatures, as well as the 
forest as a whole, along with imaginary and mythological beings, such as the spirits 
of the dead, animal-human hybrids, and even racial abstractions. For Kohn (2013: 
15), drawing on both Peirce and Uexküll’s example, doing justice to the culture of 
this community entails charting the ways in which language is nested within broader 
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forms of representation, and accepting that signs cannot be fully circumscribed by the 
symbolic. While in the main accepting Kohn’s point here, to conclude I will briefly 
return to Peirce’s account of the symbol in order to highlight another aspect of this 
concept which is sometimes overlooked in its association with linguistic signs. Without 
the scope to develop this idea in full, my contention is that, as a cipher for the biological 
basis of selfhood, a re-examination of the symbol helps to qualify the attention to 
subjectivity which has long been the focus of cultural theory outside of anthropology.
Understood as selves, living organisms do not just access their surroundings via 
the interpretation of signs, if we consider their existence in terms of a frame they 
too begin to resemble living symbols. With respect to humans alone this notion 
translates into the familiar idea that our self-recognition consists of language, but 
when applied more generally to the corporeal development and genetic evolution of 
biological beings it leads to a more striking conclusion. As is well known a symbol is 
a special sort of sign in that its interpretant maintains its significance without direct 
reference to the object it is deemed to stand for. Unlike a sign indicating a direction 
or representing a quality, a symbol asserts its meaning via an act of self-reference, 
distinguishing not only the object which it denotes, but also the medium through 
which its identity is expressed. Along similar lines, Peirce asserted that between 
the logical subject, containing the whole or part of the index (i.e. an instance of 
reference), and the logical predicate, which incorporated the icon (i.e. a particular 
quality), the symbol acted as the copula, embodying the relation which at once 
distinguished and identified these two components of a proposition (Peirce 1998: 20). 
Effectively, via the general rule determining its significance, an interpretant 
is already recursively embedded in the body of a symbol, and this potential for 
self-reference requires the introduction of yet another interpretant in order to be 
activated. Once again, along with Peirce’s semiotics, Uexküll’s functional cycle comes 
to mind, this time as a model for a situated teleology of self-discovery. In the case of 
linguistic symbols, a socially mediated convention at once guarantees the reference of 
a word and differentiates its identity, contrasting the character of this sign with other 
symbols of the same language. Yet, when the same logic is applied to an organism, it 
embodies a more complex series of acquired dispositions and habits, each of which 
maintains a life in contradistinction to the external setting on which its survival 
depends. From this perspective at least, an organism is a living symbol of the habitat 
it serves to frame. And, as a frame of nature, a habitat reciprocally differentiates both 
the individual organism and the umwelt which it inhabits. 
Conceived then as a symbol, a living sign of the ecological dynamic which 
supports its existence, the human animal should be considered not merely as the 
author or arbitrator of signs, but as the product of an ongoing process of semiosis 
which complicates its instrumental ambitions. Crucially, as Kohn demonstrates, fully 
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appreciating this process depends upon escaping the provincial domain of language, 
and contending with the fact that the symbolic realm is entangled with various non-
symbolic forms of meaning. Only in this sense, more or less at odds with a frame, can 
human beings continue to sincerely narrate their own evolution, thinking through 
a significance that at once clarifies and exceeds fixed relations. It is in a new critical 
confrontation with the hybrid body of the symbolic-self, as well as that texture of 
non-symbolic signs with which its existence is interwoven, that the humanities can 
start to face up to the challenge of a contemporary ecosemiotics. That is to begin 
reconstructing subjective agency on the threshold of an environment, without 
allowing this figure to either become trapped in a self-referential circle curtailing its 
aspirations, or to go missing in the labyrinth of its own relations.
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Круг и лабиринт – два образа экосемиотики
В статье сравниваются работы Якоба фон Юкскюля и Чарльза Пирса для рассмотрения 
двух противостоящих, но в то же время соотносимых образов экосемиотики. Целью 
является не просто противопоставление, но также исследование напряжения между 
ними, которое имеет последствия для этических аспектов формирующейся дис-
циплины – экосемиотики. Функциональный круг Юкскюля соотносится с образом 
круга, который хотя и подчеркивает интеграцию организма и окружающей среды, но 
в то же время приводит к солипсизму и чрезмерно детерминированному описанию 
экологических отношений. Рисунок лабиринта Пирса иллюстрирует эволюционную 
игру экосистем и может повлечь за собой такой уровень непредсказуемости, который 
катастрофически хаотичен. Источник этих весьма различных описаний связан с ролью 
субъективности в порождении семиотических отношений как в работах Юкскюля, 
так и Пирса. Если более регрессивные аспекты теоретической биологии Юкскюля 
смягчены телеологической интерпретацией каузальности, являющейся основой жизни, 
то ориентирующая агентность в работах Пирса зависит от внимания к идее «самости» 
(self) в его философии знаков. В заключении приводится концепция Эдуардо Кона об 
«экологии самости» (ecology of selves) и подтверждается статус организма как живого 
символа этой среды.
Ring ja labürint: ökosemiootika kaks kuvandit
Käesolevas artiklis kõrvutatakse Jakob von Uexkülli ja Charles S. Peirce’i tööd, et heita valgust 
kahele vastandlikule, ent teineteisega seostuvale ökosemiootika kuvandile. Eesmärgiks pole 
ainuüksi nende tööde vastandamine, vaid ka tähelepanu pööramine pingele, millel on taga-
järgi selle kujuneva distsipliini eetilise mõõtme osas. Uexkülli funktsiooniringi seosta-
takse ringi kujundiga, mille puhul, kuigi rõhutades organismi ja keskkonna lõimumist, 
näidatakse, et see põhjustab solipsismi ning ökoloogiliste suhete liigdeterministlikku kirjel-
damist. Peirce’i joonistust labürindist vaadeldakse labürindi esindajana, millega, kuigi see 
näitlikustab ökosüsteemide evolutsioonilist mängu, võib kaasneda ennustamatuse tase, mis 
osutub katastroofiliselt kaootiliseks. Nende lahknevate kirjelduste algallikat samastatakse 
subjektiivsuse rolliga semiootiliste suhete tekitamisel nii Uexkülli kui ka Peirce’i töödes. 
Kui Uexkülli teoreetilise bioloogia regressiivsemaid aspekte leevendab elu aluseks oleva 
kausaalsuse teleoloogiline tõlgendamine, sõltub Peirce’i tööde suunav agentsus tähelepanust 
ise ideele tema märgifilosoofias. Kokkuvõttes osutatakse Eduardo Kohni ‘Isede ökoloogia’ 
kontseptsioonile ning kinnitust leiab organismi staatus selle keskkonna elava sümbolina.
